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For nearly two decades, philosophers have given sustained attention to the controversial possibility of (legal) markets in transplantable human organs. 
Most of this discussion has focused on whether such markets would enhance 
or diminish autonomy, in either the personal sense (e.g., Taylor 2002, Zutlevics 
2001, Boddington 1998, Tadd 1991) or the Kantian moral sense (e.g., Merle 2000, 
Gerrand 1999, Morelli 1999, Munzer 1994, Chadwick 1989). What this discus-
sion has lacked is any consideration of the relationship between self-ownership 
and the use of markets or other institutions for allocating organs.1 This absence 
is not entirely surprising: whenever self-ownership is brought up in this context, 
it is usually assumed that it unambiguously implies free markets in body parts 
(e.g., Block 2003, pp. 61, 71–72, 75). Like autonomy, however, self-ownership 
is a concept with many different associated conceptions, and its implications for 
institutions that distribute organs may be more complex than is usually assumed. 
This paper will concentrate on the most prominent and defensible of these con-
ceptions—control self-ownership—and examine its implications for both market 
and nonmarket organ allocation mechanisms.
Like all varieties of ownership, self-ownership consists of a bundle of rights 
and liberties, powers and immunities, etc. The relatively narrow conception of 
ownership known as “control self-ownership” (hereafter CSO) in the literature 
is composed of the rights of use and exclusion, the power of transfer, and an im-
munity from expropriation (Christman 1991; Christman 1994, p. 160). These four 
incidents of self-ownership pertain to one’s body and labor power, and they are 
exercised by self-owners in rem (i.e., against the world) as opposed to in personam 
(i.e., against particular people). CSO is a compact conception of self-ownership, 
as its incidents all focus on managerial control over the object in question (viz., 
the self) and therefore circle about the right of exclusion; it excludes the right 
to income, which is usually included in the broader, libertarian conceptions of 
self-ownership. Various moral defenses of CSO have been offered, including 
ones based upon personal autonomy (e.g., Christman 1991) and Kantian moral 
autonomy (e.g., Taylor 2004). One thing that these defenses have in common 
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is a failure to support the more extensive conception of self-ownership prof-
fered by libertarians, who endorse an absolute right to labor income and thus 
condemn any form of redistributive labor taxation (e.g., Nozick 1974, pp. 169, 
172). Libertarians try to link the control rights constituting CSO, which protect 
individual sovereignty and are strongly supported by our moral intuitions, with 
an untrammeled right to income, but their efforts to do so have been sharply and 
effectively criticized (e.g., Christman 1994, Taylor 2005).
With this rough defi nition of CSO in hand, the essay will proceed as follows. 
First, it will provide an overview of the laws and institutions governing organ al-
location in the United States (with a little discussion of European systems) and an 
economic analysis of the causes of the shortage in transplantable human organs. 
Next, it will examine the implications of CSO for nonmarket organ allocation 
mechanisms. Finally, it will show that CSO, if accompanied by an economistic 
concern for human welfare (i.e., one involving an ordinal, interpersonally non-
comparable conception of utility), can offer limited support to markets in human 
organs, ranging from mutual-insurance pools to full-fl edged inter vivos (i.e., live 
donor) organ sales.
I. The Shortage of Transplantable Human Organs: 
Laws, Institutions, and Economics
Thanks to major advances in transplantation technology over the previous 
quarter-century (e.g., the development in the early 1980s of the powerful anti-
rejection drug cyclosporin), a wide array of human organs can now be fruitfully 
transplanted (Finkel 2001). Such organs are usually from cadaveric sources, 
but inter vivos (i.e., live donor) transplants are also possible for certain organs, 
including kidneys, lungs, and livers (only lobes are removed in the latter two 
cases—see Grady 2001).2 Unfortunately, the demand for transplantable organs 
far outstrips the available supply, and the shortage is rapidly worsening. The 
number of patients on the UNOS (United Network for Organ Sharing) waiting 
list for all categories of transplants skyrocketed from around 25,000 in 1991 to 
nearly 92,000 in 2006, but cadaveric organ donations increased very little. As a 
result, the number of patients on the waiting list who die waiting for an organ 
has increased from about 2000 per year in 1991 to over 6000 per year in 2005 
(AP 2001; Graham 1999, UNOS 2006). These fi gures probably understate the 
mortality and morbidity costs of the shortage, though: the mortality fi gures do 
not include those who may have benefi ted from an organ but were not on the 
waiting list, and the time spent waiting for a transplant often involves enormous 
suffering, especially for those patients who have experienced renal failure and 
are undergoing dialysis as a result (Crespi 1994, p. 9).3
In understanding the causes of the shortage—legal, institutional, and econom-
ic—two pieces of legislation are especially important: the Uniform Anatomical 
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Gift Act (UAGA) of 1968 and the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984. 
The UAGA, which was adopted in all states by 1973, gives individuals the right 
to become cadaveric organ donors; if they do not make their wishes known, their 
next of kin may exercise this right (Crespi 1994, p. 13).4 NOTA, which was the 
fi rst major piece of federal legislation affecting organ transplantation, established 
a national Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (operated by UNOS 
since 1986) and prohibited organ sales (Crespi 1994, pp. 14–15; Spurr 1993, 
p. 192).5 These two pieces of legislation have jointly created the current U.S. 
organ-transplant institutions: individuals (or their next of kin) make decisions to 
become cadaveric organ donors on an unpaid, voluntary basis; after death, their 
organs are “harvested” and allotted by regional Organ Procurement Organizations 
(OPOs); this allocation of transplantable organs operates with the assistance of, 
and according to triage rules promulgated by, UNOS (Graham 1999).
The failure of this system to eliminate or even alleviate the organ shortage has 
prompted the adoption of several minor reforms, none of which have signifi cantly 
reduced the size of the shortage. The fi rst of these reforms, called “required re-
quest,” was fi rst proposed by Arthur Caplan in 1984 and has since been adopted 
(with varying degrees of stringency) by dozens of states and the federal govern-
ment, which in 1987 began requiring the reform of hospitals that participated in the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs (Cohen 1989, p. 21; Crespi 1994, pp. 15–16). 
As the name suggests, this reform mandates that doctors ask the next of kin if 
they wish to donate the organs of the deceased. Physicians are understandably 
reluctant to press this issue at such a traumatic time,6 especially in the absence of 
any additional incentives, and the results have been consequently disappointing 
(Hansmann 1989, p. 61; Spurr 1993, p. 193). Noncompliance by doctors and other 
participants in the organ procurement process presents a major obstacle to efforts 
to reduce organ shortages within the existing institutional framework.
The second of these reforms, called “mandated choice,” would require all 
individuals over a certain age to choose whether or not they want to be cadaveric 
organ donors (Hansmann 1989, p. 61). Colorado adopted such a program in 1981: 
in order to obtain a driver’s license there, you must state a preference regarding 
the disposition of your organs after death; sixty percent of applicants agree to 
be donors (Cohen 1989, pp. 7, 9; MacDonald 1997, p. 183; Colorado Revised 
Statutes §§ 12-34-105 and 42-2-107). Given these results, “mandated choice” 
looks like a promising reform, especially if national versions were adopted (e.g., 
linking choice to federal income-tax returns). Unfortunately, it has not been tested 
on a large enough scale to measure its effectiveness, nor is it clear that it would 
ultimately lead to a higher rate of organ harvesting, given the continuing problem 
of physician noncompliance. Advocates of such an approach have suggested a 
variety of ways to increase the reform’s effectiveness (e.g., by arguing that all 
public education accompanying the reform advocate donation [Chouhan and 
Draper 2003]) but have not addressed the noncompliance issue.
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The third and fi nal reform, called “presumed consent” or “escheatage,” 
gives the state the right to harvest an individual’s organs upon death unless that 
individual has explicitly “opted out” of the system; moreover, the exercise of 
this right does not require the consent of the next of kin. This reform has been 
adopted in at least fourteen continental European countries, which now authorize 
procurement without consent (Crespi 1994, p. 53). Perhaps surprisingly, given the 
radical nature of this reform, the results have been disappointing: none of these 
countries has a signifi cantly higher organ donation rate than the United States, 
and a study of the French experience with escheatage found that organ supplies 
failed to increase substantially after the reform (Hansmann 1989, p. 61; Gerson 
1987, pp. 1024–1025). The source of escheatage’s failure appears once again 
to be physician noncompliance: doctors fail to take the initiative in harvesting 
organs and continue to feel a moral obligation to seek the consent of surviving 
family members (Cohen 1989, pp. 19–20).
As we have seen, physician and OPO noncompliance is the proximate cause 
of the failure of these reform efforts and of the continuing shortage in transplant-
able human organs, and public campaigns to encourage organ donation will have 
only a limited effect unless this problem can be overcome (e.g., by stiffening 
legal penalties on doctors and OPOs for failing to follow donor wishes). Many 
scholars (most notably economists) have argued, however, that the root cause of 
the problem is the absence of alienable property rights in transplantable human 
organs: because cadaveric organs have no residual claimant, no one (least of 
all the physician) has a suffi cient incentive to harvest them. Moreover, NOTA’s 
prohibition of commerce in such organs prevents OPOs from offering fi nancial 
incentives to potential donors. An effective price cap of zero exists on human 
organs, and the resulting shortage should be of little surprise to anyone familiar 
with the basic principles of economics. Consider Figure 1, where the vertical axis 
measures the price of a human organ of a certain quality (say, a healthy kidney) 
and the horizontal axis measures the quantity of this organ supplied or demanded. 
The supply of this organ is depicted by the supply curve S, which intersects the 
horizontal axis at A > 0 to indicate that even at a price of zero some people will 
be cadaveric or inter vivos organ donors. The demand for this organ is represented 
by the demand curves D, which have been drawn with steep slopes to show that 
demand is price inelastic: with their lives and health at stake, consumers will 
presumably not be very responsive to price changes. Given a price cap of zero, as 
mandated by NOTA, a shortage of transplantable organs will exist that will increase 




 (as it has done in the past decade). 
Were alienable property rights in human organs established, there would be no 
shortage: prices would equilibrate quantity supplied and quantity demanded, and 




 in Figure 
1, assuming competitive pricing). On this reading, the shortage in transplantable 
human organs is not an accident of nature but rather the result of a deliberate 
policy choice—namely, NOTA’s prohibition of markets in human organs.
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Such economic analyses lead to a predictable set of policy prescriptions for 
reforming the existing organ-donation institutions. First, on the supply side, 
fi nancial incentives must be given to either the donors themselves or their next 
of kin to encourage organ donation. Such incentives might take any number of 
forms, including but not limited to a small cash payment or donation to charity 
for those who sign donor cards, a promise to the donor to make a large payment 
to the donor’s estate if cadaveric organ harvesting occurs, or a large payment 
or donation to charity for those families who agree to the harvesting of their 
deceased relative’s organs.7 Second, on the demand side, additional incentives 
must be provided to OPOs and their employees to persuade them to harvest more 
transplantable human organs. In order not to create dangerous confl icts of interest, 
salable property rights in these organs could be vested in third parties (such as 
insurance or organ-procurement corporations, who would contract with potential 
donors), who would then have a legal cause of action against the employees of 
OPOs who renege on their duty to preserve transplantable organs after “bright 
line” events (e.g., brain death) due to family objections. Legal liability for physi-
cians might promote good stewardship of transplantable organs in those cases 
where altruism and admonition have failed.
The preceding recommendations assume, however, that the overriding policy 
objective is the elimination of the shortage. The creation of an organ market 
may have moral costs associated with it that outweigh any benefi ts of reducing 
or eliminating the shortage. The commodifi cation of organs, for example, may 
diminish respect for human life and coarsen the culture of societies that allow it 
(Radin 1987, 1996). Moreover, establishing such a market may be inconsistent 
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with a Kantian regard for human dignity. (See Munzer 1994 for a carefully quali-
fi ed argument to this effect.) These important objections to organ markets should 
be kept in mind as the remainder of the paper goes on to argue that CSO can be 
used to criticize existing and proposed nonmarket organ-transplant institutions 
and (in conjunction with other principles) to defend organ markets; these objec-
tions will be revisited in the conclusion of the paper.
II. CSO and Nonmarket Organ-Transplant Institutions
Control self-ownership, despite its relatively narrow policy purview, rules out 
at least three nonmarket organ-transplant institutions: escheatage, compensated 
takings of organs, and restricted gifting. Escheatage or “presumed consent,” which 
was discussed in the last section, is in effect the collectivization of cadaveric 
organs with an opt-out provision. The inconsistency of this policy with CSO is 
easy to see: whereas CSO assumes that its component incidents (rights of use and 
exclusion, power of transfer, and immunity from expropriation with respect to both 
body and labor) originally inhere in the person and can only be ceded with his or 
her explicit consent, escheatage assumes that a subset of these incidents—viz., 
rights, powers, etc., over transplantable cadaveric organs—originally inheres in 
the state but can be reassigned to citizens at their request. This may seem like 
a distinction without a difference—how hard is it to put in a request?—but it is 
in fact a large one. The incidents of CSO, which are vital to the protection of 
self-sovereignty, can never be viewed even in part as gifts of the state; they are 
prepolitical rights that act as prior constraints on state behavior. States that ar-
rogate any of these rights to themselves, even for the strongest of reasons (such 
as ameliorating organ shortages), fail to respect persons.8 Thus, when individuals 
die without indicating whether they wish to be organ donors, their next of kin 
should decide for the simple reason that close relatives are presumably in a better 
position than the state to know or at least guess the deceased’s preferences. As 
we have seen, this appears to be the way escheatage systems work in practice, at 
least in Europe (Gerson 1987).
Crespi has called escheatage “a governmental taking of property without 
compensation” (Crespi 1994, p. 54), which raises an interesting question: would 
governmental takings of human organs be acceptable if compensation were paid? 
To see that this question is hardly an idle one, consider the following discussion 
by Susan Rose-Ackerman about the possibility of monopoly power in the market 
for transplantable human organs and tissues:
The monopoly power issue arises most clearly in the provision of human tissue. 
. . . Thus, if tissue typing shows that your kidney is the best one to transplant into 
your cousin, a bilateral monopoly situation is created, and if sales are permitted, 
you might hold out for a large payment in return for saving your cousin’s life. 
Similarly, some types of rare antibodies are only available from a few people and are 
extremely valuable in the production of certain drugs. In such contexts, an entirely 
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unregulated market could have undesirable distributive consequences if people 
exercise their monopoly over scarce bodily tissues and antibodies at the expense of 
the sick. Prohibiting sales is not, however, the only response to the problem. One 
could instead imitate the policy followed in more conventional cases of monopoly 
power by permitting sales but regulating prices so that they refl ect marginal costs 
and risks borne by the donor. (Rose-Ackerman 1987, p. 949)
Such price regulation would certainly be allowed under CSO: as we have seen, 
CSO does not include a right to income, so the regulation and taxation of wages 
is consistent with it.
The state has a much richer array of responses to monopoly power than Rose-
Ackerman suggests, however. Consider the following two additional possibilities:
1. Eminent domain: In situations of bilateral monopoly (e.g., a “holdout” 
problem where a landowner refuses to sell property along the route of a pro-
posed highway), the state will sometimes respond by exercising its power of 
eminent domain, i.e., by seizing the property in question and compensating 
the owner at fair market value.
2. Common-carrier restrictions: In the transportation industry, state-imposed 
“common-carrier” restrictions prevent fi rms with substantial market power 
from discriminating among customers, e.g., refusing to provide service to 
some customers.
These two types of state intervention might be used in Rose-Ackerman’s kidney 
and antibody examples, respectively. If the person with the uniquely valuable 
kidney holds out (whether for spite or in expectation of a higher price), thereby 
placing his cousin at risk of premature death, the state could simply seize the 
kidney against his will and order the cousin to pay fair market value as compensa-
tion. Similarly, the state could mandate that if persons with rare antibodies decide 
to offer them for sale, then they must offer them to all comers; compensation of a 
sort would be paid in the form of the revenue received from previously excluded 
customers. Neither of these policy interventions would be consistent with CSO, 
however, because they both violate its constituent incidents: the former involves 
a blatant violation of the right of exclusion, while the latter severely restricts the 
power of transfer by specifying that transfers must be made either to all paying 
customers or to none.9 In these cases and many others, CSO functions as a bind-
ing constraint on the state’s pursuit of equity.
The third nonmarket organ-transplant institution that CSO rules out is restricted 
gifting. A particularly extreme example of restricted gifting can be found in 
Richard Titmuss’s seminal book The Gift Relationship, which focuses on blood 
donation:
In a positive sense, we believe that policy and processes should enable men to be 
free to choose to give to unnamed strangers. . . . In the interests of the freedom of 
all men they should not, however, be free to sell their blood or decide on the specifi c 
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destination of the gift. The choice between these claims—between these different 
kinds of freedom—has to be a social policy decision; in other words, it is a moral 
and political decision for society as a whole. (Titmuss 1997, p. 310)
Titmuss believes that if individuals are allowed to target their gifts of blood, a 
more generalized form of altruism will be made impossible: individuals wanting to 
make an open donation, seeing that others are targeting their gifts of blood towards 
friends or relatives, will feel like chumps and begin to target their own gifts; so 
in order to “enable men to be free to choose to give to unnamed strangers,” the 
freedom to give to named friends and relatives must be eliminated. Regardless 
of how compelling one fi nds this argument, restricted gifting is inconsistent with 
CSO because it involves a limitation on the power of transfer similar in kind to 
the common-carrier restrictions just discussed. Contra Titmuss, CSO requires 
that decisions about the destination of donated organs and tissues be made by the 
donors themselves, not by “society as a whole.”
CSO may have implications for many other organ-transplant institutions or 
practices. For example, it was mentioned earlier (note 4) that OPOs and their 
employees generally refuse to harvest the organs of willing donors if their family 
members object.10 This practice is in violation not only of the UAGA but also 
of CSO, which morally underwrites the institution of cadaveric organ donation. 
Carrying out the reasonable requests of those who have recently died is one of 
the most profound ways to show respect for them and their autonomy, especially 
where these requests concern the disposition of their own bodies.11 The unwill-
ingness of doctors to harvest organs is understandable in these circumstances, 
but respect for the person requires that third parties be empowered to apply legal 
pressure to OPOs as well as their employees in order to guarantee that the express 
wishes of the deceased are followed in such cases.
III. CSO and Market Organ-Transplant Institutions
Although control self-ownership can be used to rule out a large set of nonmar-
ket organ-transplant institutions, it cannot underwrite organ markets on its own. 
The CSO incidents of use, exclusion, transfer, and nonexpropriation are necessary 
but not suffi cient conditions to establish any kind of organ market: CSO does not 
include the right to income and consequently would not be violated were the state 
to hamstring organ markets with large taxes or fi nes. As noted above (note 9), CSO 
mandates the decriminalization of organ markets, not their legalization. In order 
to make the case for legalization and a policy of modest taxation and regulation, 
we will have to use CSO in conjunction with other political principles.
In the introduction it was noted that CSO could be defended on grounds of 
personal and moral autonomy, but it can also be defended on the grounds of wel-
fare. The argument proceeds as follows. If we equate welfare with the satisfaction 
of revealed preferences, then any voluntary (i.e., noncoerced and nonfraudulent) 
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trade is welfare-enhancing: the fact that two parties engage in such trade implies 
that it is mutually benefi cial; otherwise, they would have refused to trade. In 
order for trade to take place, however, resources must be alienable, and CSO 
guarantees the alienability of a key set of resources—namely, the human body 
and its labor. Therefore, a concern for welfare so understood should lead one to 
endorse CSO.12








This argument, however, clearly has much broader implications. It suggests 
not only the value of CSO but also the damage of state policies, such as heavy 
taxation or fi nes, that hinder voluntary exchange. Consider Figure 2 (a variant of 
Figure 1), which represents a model organ market. An untaxed and competitive 
market in transplantable human organs—made possible in part by the protec-
tion of CSO rights—will generate equilibrium price P* and quantity Q*. At this 
price, all mutually advantageous trades will be carried out. A unit tax of size T 
(represented here by the dark line) would effectively shut down the organ market, 
though, leaving no suppliers but volunteers. The welfare loss generated by this 
tax, known as its “deadweight loss,” is depicted here by the triangle with T as 
its base; it is equal in size to the welfare gains that would result were the organs 
indexed A through Q* actually traded. Smaller taxes would generate smaller sup-
ply distortions and welfare losses, of course.
The upshot of this economic analysis is that a concern for welfare militates 
in favor not only of CSO (which can be defended on autonomy grounds as well) 
but also of a legal, regulated market in human organs, with its tax rate set at a 
modest but effi cient level.13 Optimal regulation of such a market would concern 
itself with preserving competitive conditions (on both the supply and demand 
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sides), disseminating information, and guaranteeing quality.14 Thus, although 
CSO cannot underwrite organ markets on its own, it can do so in combination 
with an economistic conception of welfare. We will provisionally adopt such a 
conception for the remainder of this section and consider its implications for the 
structure of organ markets.
Such organ markets could take any number of forms. They could be limited 
to cadaveric organs, or they might include inter vivos (e.g., live donor) organs 
as well. Markets for cadaveric organs could be operated with incentives ranging 
from cash and insurance-premium reductions to charitable contributions and 
preferential access to the organ pool. Governments, insurance companies, or 
specialized private organ-procurement fi rms could organize these markets. The 
use of economic incentives might be allowed only on the supply side, with the 
allocation of organs carried out according to triage rules rather than ability to 
pay—a system that would obviously require substantial public subsidies.
On effi ciency grounds, the best system would probably be private, inclusive 
(allowing both cadaveric and inter vivos organs to be traded), and mainly cash-
based. Such a system would maximize fl exibility, encourage competition, and 
extend the market to include as many traders and kinds of trade as possible. The 
poor could be empowered to purchase organs through either government-subsi-
dized health insurance (the most likely route) or vouchers.
Opposition by citizens and medical professionals to organ markets is quite 
strong, though opinion in the transplant community is apparently shifting in favor 
of such markets (Caplan and Coelho 1998, pp. 193–195). Consequently, imple-
mentation of a full-fl edged market system, such as the one just mentioned, will be 
out of the question for the foreseeable future. Any efforts to alleviate the shortage 
in transplantable human organs through a market will therefore have to proceed 
in a piecemeal fashion and in a way that is sensitive to the concerns and fears of 
its opponents. Apart from one experiment currently underway in Pennsylvania 
(which defrays some funeral expenses for families willing to donate the organs of 
their deceased relatives—see note 7), the use of economic incentives to encourage 
organ donation has never been tried.15 In reviewing proposed institutional forms 
for an organ market, we will therefore start with the least controversial reform 
(mutual-insurance pools) and end with the most controversial (inter vivos trade). 
Policy reform in this area, if it occurs at all, will most likely follow a similar path 
of least political resistance.
A. Mutual-Insurance Pools: Schwindt and Vining
One source of opposition to organ markets may be the use of money as an 
incentive for donation. Schwindt and Vining (1998) propose an alternative to the 
current system that uses a nonmonetary incentive to encourage cadaveric-organ 
donation. They would establish a mutual-insurance pool for transplant organs, 
so that individuals who agreed to give up their organs after death would receive 
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preferential access to organs while they are alive. This “organ club” idea works 
on an easily understood principle of reciprocity: only those who are willing to 
give up their organs for others should expect access to organs that others give up. 
The payment-in-kind offered by this system might encourage additional dona-
tions and help alleviate the shortage in transplantable organs, though the size of 
the effect could only be determined by experiment.
A mutual-insurance pool of this kind could be organized in different ways. 
Schwindt and Vining suggest that it be run as a government monopsony and that 
members of the pool be given preferential access to all cadaveric organs, not 
just those donated by pool members (Schwindt and Vining 1998, pp. 728, 730). 
Neither of these are essential features of the institution, however, and the former 
has been sharply criticized in a different context by Hansmann (1989, p. 63).16
B. Futures Markets: Schwindt and Vining, Hansmann, and Cohen
Another institutional possibility, more controversial than the last, is a futures 
market in cadaveric organs. In return for some form of compensation, individu-
als would agree to give up their organs upon death to some kind of procurement 
institution. The nature of the compensation and the character of the procurement 
institution vary from proposal to proposal. Schwindt and Vining (1986) would 
make the federal government the sole purchaser of organs; compensation would 
be in cash, with the amount varying according to individual characteristics (e.g., 
health and age); and individuals would be unable to withdraw from the program 
once they had enrolled. Hansmann (1989) would make private insurance com-
panies competitive purchasers of organs; compensation would be in the form of 
reduced premia; and individuals would be able to make participation decisions 
on an annual basis. Cohen (1989) would make private companies the competitive 
purchasers of organs, and compensation would be in the form of a death benefi t 
to heirs (though he leaves the door open for cash payments).17
All of these markets would be carefully regulated. Hansmann and Cohen, for 
example, allow that prices offered for organs might be set administratively (e.g., by 
price fl oors). All of these authors are also quite hostile to inter vivos organ trades. 
This hostility is sometimes the result of principled moral opposition, but more of-
ten it results from political considerations: opposition to inter vivos organ trades is 
likely to be much stronger than opposition to futures markets. Cohen suggests prices 
that might be paid for various organs (Cohen 1989, pp. 35–36), but these numbers 
are purely speculative. As a result, it is diffi cult to know how strong an incentive 
potential sellers would have. Given that the value of an option to harvest organs 
at death is equal to the expected price of those organs at time of death, discounted 
for expected time to death and for the expected probability of a successful harvest 
of usable organs, the compensation to sellers might be low. (Incidentally, one can 
see why Hansmann makes insurance fi rms the purchasers: they employ experts in 
actuarial science who are uniquely situated to calculate such option values.)18
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C. Live-Donor Organ Sales: 
The International Forum for Transplant Ethics (IFTE)
As noted at the beginning of the paper, inter vivos (i.e., live donor) transplants 
are possible for a number of organs, including kidneys, lungs, and livers. Although 
transplanting lobes from lungs and livers can be relatively risky and painful for 
the donor, kidney donation is quite safe: Finkel (2001) reports that “of the half-
dozen studies performed on [kidney] donors, including a twenty-year follow-up, 
none have revealed any increased mortality. Health-insurance companies do 
not raise their rates for kidney donors.” Because kidney transplants are safe for 
donors and highly benefi cial for recipients (in terms of their survival rates, qual-
ity of life, and avoidance of dialysis costs), calls for live-donor kidney sales are 
becoming more frequent as the shortage of transplantable kidneys grows worse. 
A major breakthrough in the debate occurred in 1998, when a group of surgeons, 
lawyers, and medical ethicists in the transplant community, all members of the 
International Forum for Transplant Ethics (IFTE), published an editorial in the 
medical journal The Lancet calling for live-donor kidney sales (Radcliffe-Richards 
et al. 1998). Many of the authors of this piece, including Harvard professor and 
transplant surgeon Nicholas Tilney, had previously opposed such sales (Caplan 
and Coelho 1998, p. 195).
Available data suggest that the welfare gains from such sales would be sig-
nifi cant. On a cost basis alone, the savings would be big: dialysis costs about 
$40,000 per year, while kidneys (which usually last about twenty years if they 
are from live donors) cost anywhere from $800 to $10,000 in the black markets 
of such countries as India, Iraq, and Turkey (Gottlieb 2000, Finkel 2001). Hor-
ror stories abound, of course, of botched operations and the cruel exploitation 
of both donors and recipients in black markets (see Finkel 2001), but these are a 
predictable consequence of the market’s illegality. In a legal, regulated market for 
kidneys, the state (or states, if global trade were allowed) could enforce contracts, 
deter medical malpractice, and provide information about risks to both buyers 
and sellers (Hippen 2005).
The prospect of an international market in kidneys and other organs is certainly 
not an inspiring one, and many commentators are understandably hostile towards 
it.19 If futures markets in cadaveric organs were so successful as to eliminate 
the shortage, then proposals for live-donor markets might be gratefully shelved. 
Failing this possibility, however, an economistic concern for welfare militates in 
favor of experimenting with such markets for the simple reason that (for kidneys 
at least) the gains to recipients are so large and the costs to donors are so small. 
Given that the risks to donors are of the same order of magnitude as the risks they 
would incur by entering certain occupations, arguments against such markets on 
grounds of economic exploitation seem weak, at least on the utilitarian grounds 
assumed in this section.
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IV. Conclusion
This paper began by examining existing nonmarket organ-transplant institu-
tions in the U.S. and (to a lesser extent) Europe and by providing an economic 
analysis of the causes of the current organ shortage, which suggests that it is 
the result of an absence of markets. It went on to consider the implications of a 
narrow conception of self-ownership—CSO—for nonmarket and market institu-
tions for organ allocation. It found that CSO rules out a large set of nonmarket 
institutions, including escheatage, compensated takings of organs, and restricted 
gifting. It also discovered that CSO, if supplemented by an economistic concern 
for welfare, could underwrite markets in human organs of varying types, ranging 
from mutual-insurance pools to inter vivos (i.e., live donor) organ sales.
Certain Kantian and anticommodifi cationist concerns regarding organ mar-
kets were bracketed at the end of Section I, but we should return to them briefl y 
here. There are numerous features of the proposed markets—especially inter 
vivos ones—that are morally troubling, not the least of which is their tendency 
to degrade persons and their bodies, to objectify and commodify what should 
be “raised above all price” (Kant 1996, p. 84). Consider the following example, 
in which this tendency is manifest: CSO clearly grounds the rights to commit 
suicide and have one’s organs disposed of as one wishes and—if supplemented 
by an economistic concern for welfare—to have them sold in legal markets, with 
proceeds going to heirs, charity, etc. The prospect of organ markets fi lled with 
the vital organs (e.g., hearts, lungs) of suicide victims and the likelihood that the 
existence of such markets would encourage suicides at the margin (as suicidal 
people contemplated the benefi t to heirs and charities of their decision) are deeply 
disturbing. Is there any way we can respond to our strong Kantian and anticom-
modifi cationist intuitions against such markets?
As noted in the introduction, one can offer a Kantian defense of CSO (Taylor 
2004), but as we have seen the question remains whether a legalization of organ 
markets is consistent with a Kantian respect for the person. As both Stephen 
Munzer (1994) and Nicole Gerrand (1999) have observed, however, Kant’s 
worries regarding body-part sales were expressed in his Tugendlehre (Doctrine 
of Virtue) and were focused not on state legislation but on living ethically (Kant 
1996, p. 547). Consequently, there is nothing in Kant’s political philosophy that 
would obviously rule out organ markets, even if they are questionable on Kantian 
ethical grounds. Given the focus of this paper on justifying particular reforms in 
organ-allocation institutions rather than specifi c ethical practices by individuals, 
these concerns (important though they are) can reasonably be set aside.
Anticommodifi cationists’ concerns, however, cannot be dismissed so easily, 
as they are specifi cally addressed to political and institutional matters (e.g., Radin 
1987, 1996). To a great extent, their concerns overlap with Kantian ones, as they 
worry that expanding markets lead to pervasive objectifi cation and instrumental-
ism and therefore cheapen human life and coarsen our culture. If markets do in fact 
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lead to such “conceptual commodifi cation,” then their expansion is indeed a cause 
for concern, perhaps even political concern, but the empirical claim is diffi cult to 
evaluate (Radin 1996, pp. 104–106, 118). Even if we assume its truth, however, 
hostility to markets on these grounds is itself expansionist, tending to condemn 
activity (e.g., assembly-line production) that most would fi nd unobjectionable 
(Radin 1996, pp. 73, 106; cf. Tadd 1991). Still, these concerns are serious ones, 
and arguments for organ markets (or markets more generally) are often blind to 
such threats to human dignity. Whether these objections should be allowed to 
override the strong welfarist considerations that favor the legalization of organ 
markets is another matter entirely.
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NOTES
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1. A partial exception to this claim is Cherry (2005). Although Cherry never uses the 
term “self-ownership” and does not speak to the vast literature on this topic, he does briefl y 
address some of the potential incidents of self-ownership (e.g., the power of transfer) as 
well as survey three possible defenses of more or less extensive ownership schemes over 
the body (pp. 28–36). What Cherry does not do is (1) specify a particular conception of 
self-ownership and then (2) directly apply it to the subject of organ-transplant institu-
tions—which is what this paper will endeavor to do.
2. Kidneys can be obtained from both live donors and cadavers, but the quality of the 
organs from these two sources is quite different: median survival length is eleven years 
for a cadaveric kidney but over twenty years for a live-donor one (Finkel 2001).
3. “Dialysis is a tricky thing, rough on the body—it keeps you alive while gradually 
killing you. It is not uncommon for a person to lose 15 pounds during a single three-hour 
dialysis session” (Finkel 2001).
4. The UAGA gives priority to the wishes of the deceased rather than to the desires 
of their next of kin, but this rule is usually not followed in practice, resulting in lower 
levels of organ procurement:
A government survey of the nation’s 61 OPOs found wide variations in how they 
decide whether to remove organs from the dead for transplant. Just 29 of the 
groups have an offi cial policy on whether to follow the wishes of the deceased or 
of family members. If a person had indicated in a living will or on a donor card 
that he wanted to be a donor but his survivors opposed it, only seven groups—12 
percent—said they would probably remove the organs. Fifty-two of the groups 
surveyed—85 percent—said they rarely have documentation of the deceased’s 
wishes. And when they do, 51 of them—84 percent—said families do not always 
go along with the deceased’s wishes. (AP 2001; emphasis added)
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5. NOTA makes it a federal crime “for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or 
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human trans-
plantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.” The punishment for violation is a 
fi ne of up to $50,000 and/or up to fi ve years in prison (Crespi 1994, p. 15).
6. As Crespi notes, the most transplantable bodily organs come from individuals 
who have been “victim[s] of a sudden death caused by traumatic brain injury or cerebral 
hemorrhage,” especially if they are young and healthy (Crespi 1994, pp. 5–6). Such deaths 
are particularly wrenching for family members, and therefore create a perverse situation 
for doctors: the more suitable the organs are for transplant, the more likely it is doctors 
will shirk their “required request” responsibilities to procure organs for patients on the 
UNOS waiting list—who are, unlike the grieving family members, usually nameless and 
faceless abstractions.
7. The fi rst experiment along these lines is currently being conducted in 
Pennsylvania:
State health offi cials say that by early next year [2000], they will begin offering 
a stipend of about $300 to help families of organ donors cover their funeral ex-
penses; the stipend, authorized by a 1994 law, will not be paid directly to relatives, 
but rather to funeral homes under a pilot project that will be monitored for three 
years by a panel of medical ethicists to see if it increases organ donations. . . . The 
Federal Government says that the payments may violate NOTA, which classifi es 
human organs as national resources and prohibits their sale. (Stolberg 1999)
8. For a review of objections to escheatage systems, see Cohen (1989, pp. 15–21) 
and Crespi (1994, pp. 53–54). Note that for this nonmarket organ-allocation mechanism, 
as for the other two reviewed in this section, social-contract defenses might exist. That is, 
following John Rawls, individuals might hypothetically consent to certain limitations on 
CSO incidents in a suitably defi ned original position. Such defenses would need to overcome 
at least two obstacles. First, given that principles chosen in the original position are quite 
general and abstract, it is unclear whether the proposed “tailoring” of basic liberties can 
be done without opening up the possibility of other, more objectionable limitations when 
principles are actually applied via the four-stage sequence (Rawls 1999, pp. 171–176). For 
example, whereas a draft or nonconsensual autopsy seems relatively unproblematic, as the 
tradeoffs contemplated are between basic liberties alone (specifi cally, managerial rights 
over oneself versus physical integrity, which is threatened by enemy attack or by possible 
“foul play” that autopsies are designed to detect), escheatage seems more problematic, 
as the tradeoff contemplated is now between managerial rights over oneself and welfare 
concerns over artifi cially generated organ shortages—a variety of tradeoff that, if allowed 
in principle, could open the door to much more worrisome tradeoffs (e.g., depriving the 
sighted of their eyes for the welfare of the blind—see Nozick 1974, p. 206). Second, the 
nonmarket mechanisms considered here (especially the compensated taking of organs 
and tissues from the living) might, even if chosen in the original position, create severe 
“strains of commitment” for real-world citizens: psychological barriers likely exist to this 
sort of taking and would lead to perceptions of illegitimacy at best and active resistance at 
worst (Rawls 1999, pp. 153–154). The possibility of successful social-contract defenses 
cannot be ruled out, however, as these two obstacles might be overcome; it will simply 
be assumed for the rest of the paper that they cannot be, without further argument.
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9. Notice that a whole range of CSO-consistent policy interventions remain, includ-
ing the levying of fi nes to punish discriminatory behavior. A distinction must be made 
between the decriminalization and the legalization of behavior, as the former but not the 
latter allows fi nes and other civil penalties (e.g., public shaming, which is sometimes used 
to punish fathers in arrears for child support). CSO requires that a wide range of activities, 
including the holding out and discrimination described above, be decriminalized but not 
necessarily legalized: fi nes, shaming, and other civil penalties—unlike eminent domain and 
common-carrier restrictions—fail to violate the incidents of CSO, which do not include 
rights to income, public reputation, etc. Moreover, even if the practices were legalized, 
taxation and/or regulation of any earnings associated with them would be consistent with 
CSO, as noted above.
10. An anonymous reviewer reports that “some American OPOs have addressed the 
physician noncompliance issue, primarily by formally mandating procurement after dona-
tion even in the face of next-of-kin objection.” The author has been unable to determine 
how widespread or effective these policy changes have been.
11. One example of an unreasonable demand: Jeremy Bentham’s mummifi ed body, per 
his request, still sits in a closet in the board room of University College, London—though 
his head, which evidently fell off some time ago, rests on a platter at his feet (Stromberg 
1986, p. 59).
12. The “so understood” here indicates that only an ordinal, interpersonally non-
comparable form of utility is being assumed. Stronger assumptions of cardinality and 
comparability might threaten CSO by condoning CSO-violating but welfare-improving 
forced transfers. Utilitarianism of a stricter variety would be a double-edged sword here.
13. An effi cient system of commodity taxation (i.e., one that minimizes the size of 
overall deadweight losses, subject to the government’s budget constraint) generally follows 
what is called the “inverse elasticity rule”: ceteris paribus, the less price-elastic supply 
of, and demand for, a commodity are, the higher its tax rate should be. This rule makes 
intuitive sense: the less responsive suppliers and demanders are to changes in price, the 
less distorting a tax of any given size will be. Given that demanders and (possibly) sup-
pliers of organs will not be particularly responsive to price changes, relatively high tax 
rates on organs might be justifi ed on effi ciency grounds.
14. Titmuss (1997), among others (e.g., Arrow 1972 and Stewart 1992), worries that 
a market in human organs and tissues (such as blood) might lead to lower quality levels 
than would exist in a purely voluntary system: unhealthy people (e.g., vagrants, drug 
addicts), who would not have donated in a voluntary system, may do so once money is 
offered. Although the risk of such adverse-selection problems should not be minimized, 
Rose-Ackerman points out that there are any number of ways to deal with this problem 
short of banning markets: for example, imposing legal liability for damages on sellers 
(Kessel 1974), labeling organs and tissues as “volunteer” or “paid” (already required by 
the FDA for blood [Scott 1981, pp. 194–195]), and better screening, including quality 
testing of organs and tissues and background checks on donors (Rose-Ackerman 1987, 
p. 946).
15. More precisely, it has not been legally tried. For an intriguing (and at times hor-
rifying) look at the illegal market in kidneys—which is fl ourishing in such places as Israel 
and Turkey—see Finkel 2001.
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16. As with any insurance scheme, adverse-selection problems are also of concern. 
Schwindt and Vining suggest that low-risk individuals could be given preferential access 
within the pool as a kind of premium reduction (1998, p. 730). Such discrimination among 
individuals with different risk levels would help alleviate the adverse-selection problem.
17. Crespi (1994) offers yet another proposal for a futures market, but it is almost 
indistinguishable from Cohen’s.
18. In 1969, Mississippi gave its citizens the right to sell their organs to hospitals, 
which would harvest them at death; breach of contract required repayment of the option 
price (plus interest at 6 percent) to the hospital (Scott 1981, p. 190). This system was su-
perceded by NOTA in 1984, which outlawed all organ markets. There is no evidence that 
the futures market Mississippi had in place during the 1969–1984 period was ever used.
19. See, for example, Scheper-Hughes (1998, 2000) and Cohen (1999)—though the 
former has some odd moments:
But the very idea of organ scarcity has to be questioned. It’s an artifi cially cre-
ated need, invented by transplant technicians and dangled before the eyes of an 
ever-expanding sick, ageing, and dying population. And it’s a scarcity that can 
never under any circumstances be satisfi ed, for underlying the need is the quintes-
sentially human denial and refusal of death. (Scheper-Hughes 1998)
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